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SUMMARY 10
A central question in causal inference with observational studies is the sensitivity of conclu-
sions to unmeasured confounding. The classical Cornfield condition allows us to assess whether
an unmeasured binary confounder can explain away the observed relative risk of the exposure
on the outcome. It states that for an unmeasured confounder to explain away an observed rel-
ative risk, the association between the unmeasured confounder and the exposure, and also that 15
between the unmeasured confounder and the outcome, must both be larger than the observed
relative risk. In this paper, we extend the classical Cornfield condition in three directions. First,
we consider analogous conditions for the risk difference, and allow for a categorical, not just a
binary, unmeasured confounder. Second, we provide more stringent thresholds which the max-
imum of the above-mentioned associations must satisfy, rather than simply weaker conditions 20
that both must satisfy. Third, we show that all previous results on Cornfield conditions hold un-
der weaker assumptions than previously used. We illustrate their potential applications by real
examples, where our new conditions give more information than the classical ones.
Some key words: Causal inference; Confounding; Observational study; Sensitivity analysis.
1. CAUSATION, CONFOUNDING AND CORNFIELD QUESTION 25
Causal inference in observational studies is often jeopardized by unmeasured confounding. For
example, it can be the case that the crude association between the exposure and the outcome is
positive, but their association is negative within each stratum of a confounder. This phenomenon
is sometimes referred to as the Yule–Simpson paradox, and within the context of causal inference
is referred to as confounding. For instance, the association between cigarette smoking and lung 30
cancer was historically accounted for by two competing theories: cigarette smoking has a causal
effect on lung cancer; or cigarette smoking is not causative for lung cancer, and their crude
association is purely due to a common genetic cause that influences both of them. R. A. Fisher
was a major proponent of the second theory, viewing the Yule–Simpson paradox as an Achilles’
heel of causal inference in observational studies (Fisher, 1957). Instead of taking a completely 35
dismissive view on observational studies, Cornfield et al. (1959) asked the following question
regarding the common cause theory: How strong should the unmeasured confounder be, in order
to explain away the association between the exposure and outcome?
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If the strength of the unmeasured confounder required to explain away the association turns
out to be too large to make biological or practical sense, then the association between the expo-40
sure and the outcome cannot be explained only by a common cause, and the exposure-response
relationship itself must be causal. Cornfield et al. (1959) settled the causal role of smoking on
lung cancer using this approach, and their seminal work helped initiate the entire field of sen-
sitivity analysis. Here, we extend Cornfield et al. (1959)’s work to the risk difference scale, to
non-binary confounders, to stronger thresholds, and to weaker assumptions.45
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
Assume we have a binary exposure E, a binary outcomeD, and a categorical unmeasured con-
founder U . The discussion throughout the paper will make reference to the ignorable treatment
assignment assumption E {D(1),D(0)} | U (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983); where Di(1) and
Di(0) denote the potential outcomes for individual iwith and without exposure, respectively, and50
X Y | Z is used to denote that X is independent of Y conditional on Z . This is also sometimes
referred to as the assumption that the effect of E on D is unconfounded conditional on U. In
order to answer the Cornfield question, we assume E has no effect on D, and consider how large
the associations between U and E and between U and D would have to be to explain away the
observed crude association between E and D. There are three possible formulations about what55
might be meant by no effect of E on D, and we will present them from weakest to strongest.
Assumption 1. The average causal effect of E on D is zero, i.e.,
K−1∑
k=0
{pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k)− pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k)} pr(U = k) = 0.
Assumption 2. The average causal effect of E on D is zero in every stratum of U , i.e., the
exposure E is conditionally independent of the outcome D given U.
Assumption 2 implies that pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k) = pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k) and thus
entails Assumption 1.60
Assumption 3. The causal effect of E on D is zero for every individual in the population, i.e.,
Di(1) = Di(0) for each individual i.
Under the ignorability assumption, Assumption 3 implies that pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U =
k) = pr{D(1) = 1 | E = 1, U = k} = pr{D(1) = 1 | U = k} = pr{D(0) = 1 | U = k} =
pr{D(0) | U = k,E = 0} = pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k) and thus Assumption 2.65
The previous literature on Cornfield conditions are derived under the conditional independence
of the exposure E and the outcome D given the confounder U , i.e., E D | U . The ignorability
assumption involving potential outcomes guarantees the causal interpretation of Assumptions 2
and 3. Analogous assumptions can also be made using the causal diagram framework (Pearl,
1995). Without a formal causal framework, the Cornfield conditions under E D | U are the70
empirical conditions to explain away the crude exposure-outcome association by the association
between E and U and that between U and D.
3. CORNFIELD CONDITIONS FOR THE RELATIVE RISK WITH A BINARY CONFOUNDER
Cornfield et al. (1959) derived their original conditions considering a binary confounder U . Let
RDED = pr(D = 1 | E = 1)− pr(D = 1 | E = 0) and RRED = pr(D = 1 | E = 1)/pr(D =75
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1 | E = 0) denote the risk difference and the relative risk of the exposure E on the outcome
D. The risk difference and relative risk for other variables can be defined analogously. Without
essential loss of generality, we assume RRED ≥ 1 and RREU ≥ 1. The conditions for preventive
exposures are analogous. Cornfield et al. (1959) showed that when the confounder U is binary
and Assumption 2 holds, it must be true that 80
RREU ≥ RRED, (1)
which means that the relative risk of E on U is greater than or equal to the relative risk of E on
D; and also (cf. Schlesselman, 1978)
RRUD ≥ RRED, (2)
i.e., the relative risk of U on D is greater than or equal to the relative risk of E on D. Thus,
for a binary unmeasured confounder to explain away an observed relative risk, the relative risk
between the exposure and the unmeasured confounder and between the unmeasured confounder 85
and the outcome must both be greater than the observed exposure-outcome relative risk. These
necessary conditions under Assumption 2 are often now referred to as the classical Cornfield
conditions.
4. GENERALIZED CORNFIELD CONDITIONS FOR THE RELATIVE RISK
Cornfield et al. (1959) obtained their results for a binary confounder U under Assumption 2. 90
We show in the Supplementary Material that under the weaker Assumption 1 condition (1) still
holds, and condition (2) can be replaced by
max(RRUD|E=1,RRUD|E=0) ≥ RRED,
where RRUD|E=1 and RRUD|E=0 are the relative risk of U on D with and without exposure,
respectively.
Lee (2011) discussed the case when U is categorical with levels 0, 1, . . . ,K − 1. Define 95
pk = pr(E = 1 | U = k) as the probability of the exposure within U = k, qk = pk/(1− pk) as
the odds of the exposure withinU = k, andUE = maxk qk/mink qk as the ratio of the maximum
and the minimum of these odds. Define rk = pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k) as the probability of the
outcome without exposure and withU = k, and UD = maxk rk/mink rk as the ratio of the max-
imum and the minimum of these probabilities. Similarly, define r∗k = pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k) 100
as the probability of the outcome with exposure and U = k, and U∗D = maxk r∗k/mink r∗k. When
U is binary, UE reduces to the odds ratio between E and U , UD reduces to RRUD|E=0, and U∗D
reduces to RRUD|E=1.
Under Assumption 2, rk = r∗k, and so UD = U∗D. Consequently, Lee (2011) showed that the
Cornfield condition 105
min(UE , UD) ≥ RRED (3)
holds for categorical U . He also derived a generalized Cornfield condition for the maximum of
UE and UD:
max(UE , UD) ≥
{
RR1/2ED + (RRED − 1)
1/2
}2
, (4)
which gives a higher threshold than the Cornfield condition (3) and thus can be more informa-
tive. For example, an observed crude RDED = 1.5 requires that both UE and UD be greater
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than 1.5; these are essentially the classical Cornfield conditions. However, Lee (2011)’s gener-110
alized Cornfield conditions also require that the maximum of UE and UD be at least as large
as (1.51/2 + 0.51/2)2 = 3.73. Similarly, an observed crude RDED = 5 would require that the
maximum of UE and UD be at least as large as (51/2 + 41/2)2 = 17.94.
Lee (2011) obtained the above results (3) and (4) under Assumption 3, which can in fact be
weakened to Assumption 2. Furthermore in the Supplementary Material, we show that under115
Assumption 1, the following conditions must hold:
min(UE , U
′
D) ≥ RRED, max(UE , U ′D) ≥
{
RR1/2ED + (RRED − 1)
1/2
}2
,
where U ′D = max(UD, U∗D) replaces UD in conditions (3) and (4).
5. GENERALIZED CORNFIELD CONDITIONS FOR THE RISK DIFFERENCE
Because of Cornfield et al. (1959)’s influential work, sensitivity analysis based on ratio mea-
sures has long been predominant in epidemiology. However, sometimes the risk difference is of120
interest and sensitivity analysis can likewise be conducted using the risk difference. Poole (2010)
moreover showed, via a real example, that dismissal of the risk difference in sensitivity analysis
will sometimes restrict evidence for important scientific findings, a point that we will discuss
later.
For the risk difference, we define αk = pr(U = k | E = 1)− pr(U = k | E = 0), and A =125
maxk≥1 |αk|. The parameter αk measures the difference in the probability that U takes a partic-
ular value k comparing exposed and unexposed, and A is the maximum of these absolute differ-
ences. Define β1k = pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k)− pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = 0), β0k = pr(D =
1 | E = 0, U = k)− pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = 0), and B = max(maxk≥1 |β1k|,maxk≥1 |β0k|).
The parameters β1k and β0k measure the difference in the probability of the outcome comparing130
category of U = k to U = 0 in the exposed and unexposed groups, respectively; and B is the
maximum of these absolute differences. When Assumption 2 holds, β1k = β0k = βk = pr(D =
1 | U = k) and B = maxk≥1 |βk|.
For a binary confounder U with categories 0 and 1, A = RDEU is the risk difference of E
on U , and B = max(|RDUD|E=1|, |RDUD|E=0|) is the maximum of the absolute values of the135
risk differences of U onD with and without exposure. Under Assumption 2, since RDUD|E=1 =
RDUD|E=0, B = RDUD is the risk difference of U on D. The generalized Cornfield conditions
for the risk difference with a binary confounder are shown below.
THEOREM 1. If the confounder U is binary with K = 2 and Assumption 1 holds, then
min
{
RDEU ,max(RDUD|E=1,RDUD|E=0)
}
≥ RDED, (5)
max
{
RDEU ,max(RDUD|E=1,RDUD|E=0)
}
≥ RD1/2ED. (6)
Under Assumption 2, conditions (5) and (6) can be further simplified to140
min(RDEU ,RDUD) ≥ RDED, (7)
max(RDEU ,RDUD) ≥ RD
1/2
ED. (8)
The Cornfield conditions for the risk difference for a binary confounder thus show that for
an unmeasured confounder to explain away an observed risk difference for E on D, the risk
difference for E on U and also that for U on D must both be larger than the observed risk
difference for E on D. Moreover, the maximum of these two risk differences for the unmeasured
confounder must be greater than the square root of the observed risk difference for E on D. 145
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Cornfield et al. (1959) obtained, but did not appreciate the significance of equation RDED =
RDEURDUD, which leads to conditions (7) and (8). Gastwirth et al. (1998) and Poole (2010)
discussed the first Cornfield condition (7) for the risk difference in the presence of a binary
confounder, and the second one (8) is new to the best of our knowledge. Although quite simple,
the new square root bounds (6) and (8) can be substantial improvements over (5) and (7), since 150
RDED is very small in many applications.
We can further extend these Cornfield conditions for the risk difference to allow for a cate-
gorical, rather than binary, confounder U with an arbitrary number of categories. However, the
generalized Cornfield conditions for the risk difference then depend on the number of categories
of the confounder U . With more than two categories, we have the following conditions. 155
THEOREM 2. With a categorical confounder U(K ≥ 3), if Assumption 1 holds,
A ≥ RDED/(K − 1), (9)
B ≥ RDED/2, (10)
max(A,B) ≥ max
[
{RDED/(K − 1)}1/2,RDED/2
]
. (11)
Theorem 2 does not rely on the choice of the reference level of U , so continues to hold if we
arbitrarily relabel some other level to be U = 0. Inequalities (9) to (11) show that the conditions
for A and B become weaker with a larger value of K. For example, if U has three categories
with K = 3, as would often be the case with a genetic confounder, the generalized Cornfield 160
conditions above can be simplified as
min(A,B) ≥ RDED/2, max(A,B) ≥ (RDED/2)1/2. (12)
Although the conditions above are weaker when U has three categories, the lower bound of the
maximum of A and B, (RDED/2)1/2, can still be very informative even if RDED is small.
In many practical problems, the following monotonicity assumption is plausible.
Assumption 4. For k = 1, . . . , (K − 1), αk ≥ 0. 165
Assumption 4 requires that each non-zero category of U is more prevalent under exposure than
without the exposure. If only one category of U is less prevalent under exposure, Assumption
4 holds if we choose this category to be the reference level U = 0. For example, Assumption 4
holds for a binary confounder U without imposing any restrictions.
THEOREM 3. With a categorical confounder U(K ≥ 2), under Assumptions 1 and 4, 170
A ≥ RDED/(K − 1), (13)
B ≥ RDED, (14)
max(A,B) ≥ max
[
{RDED/(K − 1)}1/2,RDED
]
. (15)
For example, the conditions in (12) with a three category confounder can be improved to
A ≥ RDED/2, B ≥ RDED, max(A,B) ≥ max
{
(RDED/2)1/2,RDED
}
. (16)
We call (5) to (16) the generalized Cornfield conditions for the risk difference. The bounds
from (5) to (16) are sharp, in the sense that they cannot be improved without additional assump-
tions. The bounds given above for Assumption 2 are all also sharp under Assumption 3. The
proofs for attaining the bounds are all given in the Supplementary Material.175
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6. ILLUSTRATIONS
Example 1. Poole (2010) discussed an example concerning insights from the Confield condi-
tions for the risk difference, which were overlooked by Cornfield et al. (1959). Hammond and
Horn (1958)’s study of smoking and death from coronary artery disease found that RRED = 1.7
and RDED = 0.013%. Based on the relative risks, there is limited evidence for a true causal180
of smoking on death, since the crude relative risk of smoking on death RRED = 1.7 is smaller
than the relative risk of bad temper in smokers and nonsmokers RREU = 2.6 found in Lilienfeld
(1959)’s study. However, the risk difference of the exposure on bad temper is smaller than the ob-
served risk difference of the exposure on the outcome, since RDEU = 0.012% < RDED. Poole
(2010) noted that if we assume U = bad temper, then the common cause U could not explain185
away the risk difference of smoking on death from coronary artery diseases.
Poole’s observation was very insightful. Unfortunately, however, the difference between the
exposure-confounder association RDEU = 0.012% and the actual observed exposure-outcome
association RDED = 0.013% is very small and likely within sampling variabilities of these
studies. In fact, Poole (2010) noted that RDED = 0.012% in Doll and Hill (1964)’s study,190
and then the basic Cornfield condition RDEU ≥ RDED would not be sufficient to reject the
common cause theory. However, if we were willing to assume that the risk difference be-
tween smoking and bad temper is stronger than the risk difference between bad temper and
death, i.e., RDEU > RDUD|E=1 and RDEU > RDUD|E=0, then by the generalized Cornfield
conditions for the measures of RDEU and max(RDUD|E=1,RDUD|E=0) given in (6), for the195
unmeasured common cause bad temper to explain away the effect, we would require that
RDEU = max(RDEU ,RDUD|E=1,RDUD|E=0) ≥ RD
1/2
ED = (0.012%)
1/2 = 1.095%, which is
more than 84 times larger than the observed RDEU . The confounder bad temper could then not
explain away the association, and the evidence for causation would be very strong.
Example 2. R. A. Fisher conjectured that “cigarette-smoking and lung cancer, though200
not mutually causative, are both influenced by a common cause, in this case the in-
dividual genotype” (Fisher, 1957). Consider the case that the genotype has three cate-
gories (AA, Aa, aa), where the Cornfield condition with a binary confounder does not ap-
ply. From Hammond and Horn (1958)’s study, the relative risk and the risk difference
of smoking on lung cancer are RRED = 10.7 and RDED = 0.094%. If we want to as-205
sume no average causal effect of smoking on lung cancer, the generalized Cornfield con-
ditions for the risk ratio require that min(UE , U ′D) ≥ RRED = 10.7, and max(UE , U ′D) ≥
{RR1/2ED + (RRED − 1)
1/2}2 = (10.71/2 + 9.71/2)2 = 40.77. Without Assumption 4, our con-
ditions for the risk difference require A ≥ RDED/2 = 0.047%, B ≥ RDED/2 = 0.047%, and
max(A,B) ≥ (RDED/2)1/2 = 2.168%, and with Assumption 4, the condition forB can be fur-210
ther improved to B ≥ RDED = 0.094%. These bounds are all useful for determining whether a
certain genotype can explain away the association between smoking and lung cancer.
7. DISCUSSION
The risk difference scale can sometimes be used in sensitivity analysis. More specifically, as
pointed out by Poole (2010), the Cornfield conditions for the risk difference can be useful for215
discovering causal effects in observational studies. Our new lower bound of the maximum of
RDEU and max(RDUD|E=1,RDUD|E=0) is a significant improvement of the basic Cornfield
condition for the risk difference with a binary confounder, when the risk difference of the ex-
posure on the outcome is small. We also illustrate its usefulness in Example 1, where the lower
bound may provide a sharper conclusion. 220
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The results in our paper are also interesting from a theoretical perspective in two further re-
spects. First, it has been argued that causal conclusions are most sensitive to an unobserved con-
founder that is binary rather than categorical or continuous, at least when using matched pairs
analysis. It has been suggested that it thus suffices to perform sensitivity analysis with a binary
confounder (Wang and Krieger, 2006). However, these results on the conservative nature of a 225
binary confounder were derived with sensitivity analysis parameters expressed on a ratio scale.
In this paper, we have likewise seen that using a ratio scale the Cornfield conditions for a cate-
gorical unmeasured confounder in (3) are essentially identical to those with a binary unmeasured
confounder in (1) and (2). For relative risks, a binary unmeasured confounder seems to once
again suffice. However, our results here for the risk difference demonstrate that the generalized 230
Cornfield conditions for the risk difference do depend on the number of categories of the unmea-
sured confounder U . The requirements on the unmeasured confounder weaken as the number of
categories of U increases. Thus the sensitivity of the causal conclusions when the unmeasured
confounder is binary is not the most conservative case if the sensitivity analysis parameters are
expressed on the risk difference scale. 235
Second, since Cornfield et al. (1959)’s seminal work, the relative risk measure has often been
claimed to be better suited for assessing causality. Poole (2010) recently summarized the histor-
ical reasons for this and also criticized this notion. Our results demonstrate that the generalized
Cornfield conditions for the risk difference do depend on the number of categories of U , while
those for the relative risk do not. The Cornfield conditions for the risk difference become less 240
informative as the number of categories increases. The Cornfield conditions for the relative risk
do not suffer from this problem. Therefore, using the relative risk for assessing causality may
in fact have some basis, because the generalized Cornfield conditions for the relative risk do not
depend on the number of categories of U .
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Supplementary Materials
APPENDIX A
This Appendix gives a proof of the Cornfield conditions for the relative risk with a binary270
confounder under Assumption 1.
Proof. Define f = pr(U = 1), pe = pr(E = 1), f1 = pr(U = 1 | E = 1), and f0 = pr(U =
1 | E = 0). We have f = pef1 + (1− pe)f0, and we assume RREU = f1/f0 ≥ 1. Recall the
definitions of r∗k = pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k) and rk = pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k) in the main
text. For simplicity in the proof, we use RR1 = RRUD|E=1 = r∗1/r∗0 and RR0 = RRUD|E=0 =275
r1/r0 as the relative risks of U on D given E = 1 and E = 0, respectively.
Assumption 1
1 =
pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = 1)pr(U = 1) + pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = 0)pr(U = 0)
pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = 1)pr(U = 1) + pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = 0)pr(U = 0)
is equivalent to
1 =
r∗1f + r
∗
0(1− f)
r1f + r0(1− f)
=
r∗0
r0
×
RR1f + (1− f)
RR0f + (1− f)
. (17)
Therefore, the observed relative risk of E on D
RRED =
pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = 1)pr(U = 1 | E = 1) + pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = 0)pr(U = 0 | E = 1)
pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = 1)pr(U = 1 | E = 0) + pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = 0)pr(U = 0 | E = 0)
can be expressed as
RRED =
r∗1f1 + r
∗
0(1− f1)
r1f0 + r0(1− f0)
=
r∗0
r0
×
RR1f1 + (1− f1)
RR0f0 + (1− f0)
=
RR0f + (1− f)
RR1f + (1− f)
×
RR1f1 + (1− f1)
RR0f0 + (1− f0)
.
The last equation above is obtained by replacing r∗0/r0 by {RR0f + (1− f)}/{RR1f + (1−
f)} due to (17). The above equation can be further simplified as
RRED = G×H,
where
G =
RR0f + (1− f)
RR1f + (1− f)
and H = RR1f1 + (1− f1)
RR0f0 + (1− f0)
.
We first treat (RR1,RR0, f1, f0) as fixed, and thus G is a function of pe with partial derivative280
∂G
∂pe
=
∂
∂f
{
RR0f + (1− f)
RR1f + (1− f)
}
×
∂f
∂pe
=
(RR0 − RR1)(f1 − f0)
{RR1f + (1− f)}2
.
Therefore, G is increasing in pe ∈ [0, 1] if RR0 > RR1, and non-increasing in pe ∈ [0, 1] if
RR0 ≤ RR1. Our proof below is divided into two cases accordingly.
If RR0 > RR1, G has its maximum at pe = 1 or f = f1. Therefore,
RRED ≤
RR0f1 + (1− f1)
RR1f1 + (1− f1)
×
RR1f1 + (1− f1)
RR0f0 + (1− f0)
=
(RR0 − 1)f1 + 1
(RR0 − 1)f0 + 1
. (18)
With f1 ≥ f0, we must have RR0 ≥ 1, since RR0 < 1 would contradict the assumption
RRED ≥ 1. Then (18) attains its maximum at f1 = 1 and f0 = 0, implying that RRED ≤ 285
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RR0 = max(RR1,RR0). We further obtain from (18) that
RRED ≤
f1
f0
×
1 + (1− f1)/RR0
1 + (1− f0)/RR0
≤
f1
f0
= RREU , (19)
where the second inequality in (19) holds since f1 ≥ f0.
If RR0 ≤ RR1, G has its maximum at pe = 0 or f = f0. Therefore,
RRED ≤
RR0f0 + (1− f0)
RR1f0 + (1− f0)
×
RR1f1 + (1− f1)
RR0f0 + (1− f0)
=
(RR1 − 1)f1 + 1
(RR1 − 1)f0 + 1
. (20)
By similar argument, we must have RR1 ≥ 1, and the right-hand side of (20) attains its maxi-
mum at f1 = 1 and f0 = 0. Therefore RRED ≤ RR1 = max(RR1,RR0). The same argument 290
as above shows that RRED ≤ RREU .
In summary, we have shown that max(RR1,RR0) ≥ RRED and RREU ≥ RRED in all
cases. 
APPENDIX B
This Appendix gives a proof of Lee (2011)’s conditions for relative risk under Assumption 1.
Our proof here is based on Lee (2011)’s notation and conclusions. Define
SRRE+ =
∑K−1
k=0 pr(U = k)pr(E = 1 | U = k)pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k)∑K−1
k=0 pr(U = k)pr(E = 1 | U = k)pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k)
as the standardized relative risk with the exposed group taken as the standard population,
SRRE− =
∑K−1
k=0 pr(U = k)pr(E = 0 | U = k)pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k)∑K−1
k=0 pr(U = k)pr(E = 0 | U = k)pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k)
as the standardized relative risk with the unexposed group taken as the standard population, and
SRRT =
∑K−1
k=0 pr(U = k)pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k)∑K−1
k=0 pr(U = k)pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k)
as the standardized relative risk with the total group as the standard population. And the con-
founding relative risks are defined as CRRE+ = RRED/SRRE+,CRRE− = RRED/SRRE−,
and CRRT = RRED/SRRT . Lee (2011) showed that
1
CRRT
=
w
CRRE+
+
1− w
CRRE−
,
where w is a positive number between 0 and 1. The following conclusions in Lee (2011) are295
useful for our proof:
CRRE+ ≤
{
(UEUD)
1/2 + 1
U
1/2
E + U
1/2
D
}2
, CRRE− ≤
{
(UEU
∗
D)
1/2 + 1
U
1/2
E + U
∗1/2
D
}2
,
Proof. It can be directly verified that
(UEUD)
1/2 + 1
U
1/2
E + U
1/2
D
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is increasing in both UD and UE . For example, we have
∂
∂UD
{
(UEUD)
1/2 + 1
U
1/2
E + U
1/2
D
}
=
U
1/2
E U
−1/2
D (U
1/2
E + U
1/2
D )− {(UEUD)
1/2 + 1}U
−1/2
D
2(U
1/2
E + U
1/2
D )
2
=
UE − 1
2U
1/2
D (U
1/2
E + U
1/2
D )
2
≥ 0.
By definition of U ′D and according to Lee (2011), we have
CRRE+ ≤
{
(UEU
′
D)
1/2 + 1
U
1/2
E + U
′1/2
D
}2
and CRRE− ≤
{
(UEU
′
D)
1/2 + 1
U
1/2
E + U
′1/2
D
}2
,
which lead to
1
CRRT
=
SRRT
RRED
=
w
CRRE+
+
1−w
CRRE−
≥
{
(UEU
′
D)
1/2 + 1
U
1/2
E + U
′1/2
D
}−2
.
When Assumption 1 holds with SRRT = 1, we have{
(UEU
′
D)
1/2 + 1
U
1/2
E + U
′1/2
D
}2
≥ RRED.
Letting U ′D → +∞ on the left-hand side of the last equation, we have UE ≥ RRED. By symme-
try, we have U ′D ≥ RRED. And therefore, min(UE , U ′D) ≥ RRED. By monotonicity, we have
{
max(UE , U
′
D) + 1
2max1/2(UE , U ′D)
}2
≥
{
(UEU
′
D)
1/2 + 1
U
1/2
E + U
′1/2
D
}2
≥ RRED,
which implies that max(UE , U ′D) ≥
{
RR1/2ED + (RRED − 1)
1/2
}2
. Therefore, Lee (2011)’s
conditions hold for UE and U ′D. 
APPENDIX C 300
This Appendix gives proofs of the generalized Cornfield conditions for the risk difference
under Assumption 1. In order to prove Theorems 1 to 3, we need the following lemma.
LEMMA 1. Under Assumption 1, the risk difference of E on D can be expressed as
RDED =
K−1∑
k=1
αk{β1kpr(E = 0) + β0kpr(E = 1)}.
Proof of Lemma 1. First, Assumption 1 is equivalent to
K−1∑
k=0
pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k)pr(U = k) =
K−1∑
k=0
pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k)pr(U = k),
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and therefore we have
RDED =
K−1∑
k=0
pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k)pr(U = k | E = 1)
−
K−1∑
k=0
pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k)pr(U = k | E = 0)
=
K−1∑
k=0
pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k){pr(U = k | E = 1)− pr(U = k)}
−
K−1∑
k=0
pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k){pr(U = k | E = 0)− pr(U = k)}.
Applying the law of total probability, we have that
pr(U = k | E = 1)− pr(U = k)
= pr(U = k | E = 1)− pr(U = k | E = 1)pr(E = 1)− pr(U = k | E = 0)pr(E = 0)
= {pr(U = k | E = 1)− pr(U = k | E = 0)}pr(E = 0)
= αkpr(E = 0),
and similarly, pr(U = k | E = 0)− pr(U = k) = −αkpr(E = 1). Therefore,305
RDED =
K−1∑
k=0
αkpr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k)pr(E = 0) +
K−1∑
k=0
αkpr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k)pr(E = 1)
=
K−1∑
k=0
αk{pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k)pr(E = 0) + pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k)pr(E = 1)}.
Using the fact that α0 = −
∑K−1
k=1 αk, we obtain that
RDED =
K−1∑
k=1
αk{pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k)pr(E = 0) + pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k)pr(E = 1)}
−
K−1∑
k=1
αk{pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = 0)pr(E = 0) + pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = 0)pr(E = 1)}
=
K−1∑
k=1
αk{β1kpr(E = 0) + β0kpr(E = 1)}. 
Proof of Theorem 1. For a binary confounder U with K = 2, we have
RDED = α1{β11pr(E = 0) + β01pr(E = 1)}
= RDEU{RDUD|E=1pr(E = 0) + RDUD|E=0pr(E = 1)}.
Since RDED ≥ 0 and RDEU ≥ 0, we have RDUD|E=1pr(E = 0) + RDUD|E=0pr(E =
1) ≥ 0. Evidently, it is impossible that both RDUD|E=1 and RDUD|E=0 are neg-
ative. When RDUD|E=1 > 0 and RDUD|E=0 > 0, we have RDUD|E=1pr(E =
0) + RDUD|E=0pr(E = 1) < max(RDUD|E=1,RDUD|E=0). When RDUD|E=1 > 0 and
RDUD|E=0 < 0, we have RDUD|E=1pr(E = 0) + RDUD|E=0pr(E = 1) < RDUD|E=1 =
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max(RDUD|E=1,RDUD|E=0). When RDUD|E=1 < 0 and RDUD|E=0 > 0, we also have
RDUD|E=1pr(E = 0) + RDUD|E=0pr(E = 1) < max(RDUD|E=1,RDUD|E=0). Therefore,
RDED ≤ RDEU ×max(RDUD|E=1,RDUD|E=0),
which implies that
min
{
RDEU ,max(RDUD|E=1,RDUD|E=0)
}
≥ RDED,
max
{
RDEU ,max(RDUD|E=1,RDUD|E=0)
}
≥ RD1/2ED. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Since
RDED =
∣∣∣K−1∑
k=1
αk{β1kpr(E = 0) + β0kpr(E = 1)}
∣∣∣
≤ A
K−1∑
k=1
|β1kpr(E = 0) + β0kpr(E = 1)|
≤ A
K−1∑
k=1
max(|β1k|, |β0k|) ≤ A(K − 1),
we have A ≥ RDED/(K − 1). The equality is attainable if and only if (c1) αk = RDED/(K −310
1), and β1k = β0k = 1 for k = 1, . . . , (K − 1); or (c2) αk = −1, and β1k = β0k = −1 for k =
1, . . . ,K. The condition (c1) requires that the risk difference of the exposure E on each category
of U to be the same as RDED/(K − 1), and the confounder U is a perfect predictor of the
disease D. Similar interpretation applies to condition (c2).
Since315
RDED =
∣∣∣K−1∑
k=1
αk{β1kpr(E = 0) + β0kpr(E = 1)}
∣∣∣
≤
K−1∑
k=1
|αk|max(|β1k|, |β0k |) ≤ B
K−1∑
k=1
|αk|
≤ B
K−1∑
k=1
pr(U = k | E = 1) +B
K−1∑
k=1
pr(U = k | E = 0) ≤ 2B,
the lower bound forB isB ≥ RDED/2. The equality is attainable if and only if pr(U = 0 | E =
0) = pr(U = 0 | E = 1) = 0, pr(U = k | E = 1)pr(U = k | E = 0) = 0 for k = 1, ..., (K −
1), and β1k = β0k = ±RDED/2 with the same sign as αk.
Since RDED ≤ (K − 1)AB ≤ (K − 1)max2(A,B), we have max(A,B) ≥
{RDED/(K − 1)}1/2, with the equality attainable if and only if αk = β1k = β0k =320
±{RDED/(K − 1)}1/2 for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1. Due to the constraint
∑K−1
k=1 |αk| ≤ 2 dis-
cussed above, the equality is attainable if and only if (K − 1){RDED/(K − 1)}1/2 ≤ 2
or (K − 1)RDED ≤ 4. When (K − 1)RDED > 4, B can attain its lower bound
RDED with
∑K−1
k=1 |αk| = 2. Therefore, A can attain its lower bound 2/(K − 1),
which, in this case, is smaller than RDED/2. In summary, the lower bound for 325
max(A,B) is max(A,B) ≥ {RDED/(K − 1)}1/2, if (K − 1)RDED ≤ 4, and
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max(A,B) ≥ RDED/2, if (K − 1)RDED > 4. Equivalently, we have max(A,B) ≥
max
[
{RDED/(K − 1)}1/2,RDED/2
]
. 
Proof of Theorem 3. The bound for A remains the same. Since
RDED =
∣∣∣K−1∑
k=1
αk{β1kpr(E = 0) + β0k(E = 1)}
∣∣∣
≤ B
K−1∑
k=1
|αk| ≤ B(−α0) ≤ B,
the lower bound for B is B ≥ RDED The equality is attainable if and only if α0 = −1 and 330
β1k = β0k = RDED for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1. The condition requires that the presence or absence
of the confounder U is perfectly predictive to the exposure E, and each category of U is equally
predictive to the disease D.
Since RDED ≤ (K − 1)AB ≤ (K − 1)max2(A,B), we have max(A,B) ≥
{RDED/(K − 1)}1/2, with the equality attainable if and only if αk = β1k = β0k = 335
±{RDED/(K − 1)}1/2 for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1. Due to the constraint
∑K−1
k=1 αk = −α0 ≤ 1
discussed above, the equality is attainable if and only if (K − 1){RDED/(K − 1)}1/2 ≤ 1
or (K − 1)RDED ≤ 1. When (K − 1)RDED > 1, B can attain its lower bound RDED with∑K−1
k=1 αk = 1. Therefore, A can attain its lower bound 1/(K − 1), which, in this case, is smaller
than RDED. In summary, the lower bound for max(A,B) is max(A,B) ≥ {RDED/(K − 340
1)}1/2, if (K − 1)RDED ≤ 1, and max(A,B) ≥ RDED, if (K − 1)RDED > 1. Equivalently,
we have max(A,B) ≥ max
[
{RDED/(K − 1)}1/2,RDED
]
. 
